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CREDAL NETS UNDER EPISTEMIC IRRELEVANCE
JASPER DE BOCK AND GERT DE COOMAN
ABSTRACT. We present a new approach to credal nets, which are graphical models that
generalise Bayesian nets to imprecise probability. Instead of applying the commonly used
notion of strong independence, we replace it by the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance.
We show how assessments of epistemic irrelevance allow us to construct a global model
out of given local uncertainty models and mention some useful properties. The main results
and proofs are presented using the language of sets of desirable gambles, which provides a
very general and expressive way of representing imprecise probability models.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is under construction. At the current stage, it only aims to present some
essential ideas and theorems. We intend to extend this preliminary work to a full size paper
in the near future.
2. SETS OF DESIRABLE GAMBLES
Consider a variable X taking values in some non-empty and finite set X. Knowledge
about the possible values this variable may assume can be modelled in various ways: prob-
ability mass functions, credal sets and coherent lower previsions are only a few of the many
options. We choose te use a different approach, being a set of desirable gambles. We will
model a subject’s beliefs regarding the value of a variable X by means of his behaviour:
which gambles (or bets) on the unknown value of X would our subject be inclined to parti-
cipate in?
Although they are not as well known as other (imprecise) probability models, sets of
desirable gambles have a series of advantages. To begin with, sets of desirable gambles are
more expressive then both credal sets and lower previsions. For example, sets of desirable
gambles are easily able to model such things as conditioning on events with probability
zero, which is something other imprecise probability models cannot do. Secondly, sets of
desirable gambles have the advantage of being operational, meaning that there is a practical
way of constructing a model that represents the subject’s beliefs. In the case of sets of
desirable gambles this can be done by offering the subject certain gambles and asking him
whether or not he wants to participate. And finally, it tends to be much easier to construct
proofs in the language of coherent sets of desirable gambles then it is to do so in other
languages. We will give a brief survey of the basics of sets of desirable gambles and refer
to Refs. [1, 2, 3] for more details and further discussion.
2.1. Desirable gambles. A gamble f is a real-valued map on X which is interpreted as
an uncertain reward. If the value of the variable X turns out to be x, the (possibly negative)
reward is f (x). A non-zero gamble is called desirable if we accept the transaction in which
(i) the actual value x of the variable is determined, and (ii) we receive the reward f (x).
The zero gamble is not considered to be desirable, mainly because we want desirability to
represent a strict preference to the zero gamble.
We will model a subject’s beliefs regarding the possible values X that a variable X can
assume by means of a set D of desirable gambles, which will be a subset of the set G (X ) of
all gambles on X. For any two gambles f and g in G (X ), we say that f ≥ g if f (x)≥ g(x)
for all x in X and f > g if f ≥ g and f 6= g. We use G (X )>0 to denote the set of all gambles
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f ∈ G (X ) for wich f > 0 and G (X )≤0 to denote the set of all gambles f ∈ G (X ) for
which f ≤ 0. As a special kind of gambles we consider the indicator functions. For every
event A⊆X, the gamble IA is called the indicator function of A. It is equal to 1 if the event
occurs (the variable X assumes a value in A) and zero otherwise.
2.2. Coherence. In order to represent a rational subject’s beliefs about the values a vari-
able can assume, a set D ⊆ G (X ) of desirable gambles should satisfy some rationality
requirements. If these requirements are met, we call the set D coherent.
For all f , f1, f2 ∈ G (X ) and all real λ > 0:
D1. if f ≤ 0 then f /∈D
D2. if f > 0 then f ∈D
D3. if f ∈D then λ f ∈D [scaling]
D4. if f1, f2 ∈D then f1 + f2 ∈D [combination]
Requirements D3 and D4 make D a convex cone: posi(D) = D , where we have used the
positive hull operator posi which generates the set of finite strictly positive linear combin-
ations of elements of its argument set:
posi(D) :=
{
n
∑
k=1
λk fk : fk ∈D ,λk ∈R+0 ,n ∈ N0
}
. (1)
Here R+0 is the set of all strictly positive real numbers, and N0 the set of all natural numbers
(positive integers).
2.3. Natural extension. In practice, a set of desirable gambles will usually be elicited by
presenting an expert a number of gambles and asking him wether or not he finds them
desirable. This results in a (finite) assessment of desirable gambles A ⊆ G (X ) and the
question raises whether this can be extended to a coherent set. It is shown in Ref. [5] that
if the assessment A can be extended to a coherent set of desirable gambles, the smallest
(most conservative) such coherent set is given by E(A ) := posi(A ∪G (X )>0) and we
then call E(A ) the natural extension of A .
2.4. Maximal sets of desirable gambles. A coherent set D of desirable gambles on X is
called maximal if it is not strictly included in any other coherent set of desirable gambles
on X. In other words, if adding any gamble f to D makes sure we can no longer extend the
set D ∪{ f} to a set that is still coherent. We will denote maximal sets of desirable gambles
as M instead of using the general notation D .
These maximal sets of desirable gambles have a number of useful properties. For ex-
ample, a coherent set D of desirable gambles on X is allways the intersection of all the
maximal coherent sets M of desirable gambles on X that include D ; see Ref. [5]. In other
words, f ∈ D if and only if f ∈ M for every M ⊇ D . As a consequence, if a gamble
f ∈ G (X) is not an element of D , there is at least one maximal set M ⊇ D for which
f /∈M . Another useful property that holds for every maximal set M is that for all gambles
f 6= 0 in G (X ), either f or − f is an element of M ; see Ref. [2].
3. CREDAL NETS UNDER EPISTEMIC IRRELEVANCE
3.1. Directed acyclic graphs. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a graphical model that
is well known for its use in bayesian networks. It consists of a finite set of nodes (vertices),
which are joint together into a network by a set of directed edges, each edge connecting
one node with another. Since this directed graph is assumed to be acyclic, it is not possible
to follow a sequence of edges from node to node and end up back at the same node you
started from.
We will call G the set of nodes s associated with a given DAG. For two nodes s and t, if
there is a directed edge from s to t, we say that s is a parent of t and t is a child of s. Note
that a single node can have multiple parents and multiple children. For any node s, its set
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of parents is denoted by P(s) and its set of children by C(s). If a node s has no parents, we
use the convention m(s) = /0 and we call it a root node. The set of all root nodes is denoted
as G := {s ∈G : P(s) = /0}. If C(s) = /0, then we call s a leaf, or terminal node. We denote
by G♦ := {s ∈ G : C(s) 6= /0} the set of all non-terminal nodes.
For nodes s and t, we write s ⊑ t if s precedes t, i.e., if there is a directed segment
(sequence of directed edges) in the graph from s to t. If s ⊑ t and s 6= t, we say that s ⊏ t.
For any node s, we denote its set of descendants by D(s) := {t ∈ G : s ⊏ t} and its set of
non-parent non-descendants is given by N(s) := G\ (P(s)∪{s}∪D(s)).
3.2. Variables and gambles on them. With each node s of the tree, there is associated a
variable Xs assuming values in a non-empty finite set Xs. We denote by G (Xs) the set of
all gambles on Xs. We extend this notation to more complicated situations as follows. If
S is any subset of G, then we denote by XS the tuple of variables whose components are
the Xs for all s ∈ S. This new joint variable assumes values in the finite set XS := ×s∈SXs
and the corresponding set of gambles is denoted by G (XS). When S = /0, we let X /0 be a
singleton. The corresponding variable X /0 can then only assume this single value, so there
is no uncertainty about it. G (X /0) can then be identified with the set R of real numbers.
Generic elements of Xs are denoted by xs or zs and similarly for xS and zS in XS. Also, if
we mention a tuple zS, then for any t ∈ S, the corresponding element in the tuple will be
denoted by zt . We assume all variables in the network to be logically independent, meaning
that the variable XS may assume all values in XS, for all /0 ⊆ S ⊆ G.
We will frequently use the simplifying device of identifying a gamble fS on XS with its
cylindrical extension to XU , where S ⊆U ⊆ G. This is the gamble fU on XU defined by
fU (xU) := fS(xS) for all xU ∈XU . To give an example, if K ⊆ G (XG), this trick allows us
to consider K ∩G (XS) as the set of those gambles in K that depend only on the variable
XS. As another example, this device allows us to identify the gambles I{xS} and I{xS}×XG\S ,
and therefore also the events {xS} and {xS}×XG\S. More generally, for any event A⊆XS,
we can identify the gambles IA and IA×XG\S , and therefore also the events A and A×XG\S.
3.3. Modelling our beliefs about the network. Throughout the paper, we consider sets of
desirable gambles as models for a subject’s beliefs about the values that certain variables
in the network may assume. One of the main contributions of this paper, further on in
Section 4, will be to show how to construct a joint model for our network, being a coherent
set DG of desirable gambles on XG.
From such a joint model, one can derive both conditional and marginal models. Let us
start by explaining how to condition the global model DG. Consider a subset I of G and
assume we want to update the model DG with the information that XI = xI . This leads to
the following updated set of desirable gambles:
DG⌋xI :=
{ f ∈ G (XG\I) : I{xI} f ∈DG},
which represents our subject’s beliefs about the value of the variable XG\I , conditional on
the observation that XI assumes the value xI . This definition is very intuitive, since I{xI} f
is the unique gamble that is called off (is equal to zero) if XI 6= xI and equal to f if XI = xI .
Notice that since I{x /0} = 1, the special case of conditioning on the certain variable X /0 does
not yield any problems. As wanted, it amounts to not conditioning at all.
Marginalisation is also very intuitive in the language of sets of desirable gambles. Sup-
pose we want to derive a marginal model for our subject’s beliefs about the variable XO,
where O is some subset of G. This can be done by using the set of desirable gambles that
belong to DG but only depend on the variable XO:
margO(DG) :=
{ f ∈ G (XO) : f ∈DG}.
Now let I and O be disjoint subsets of G and let xI be any element of XI . By sequen-
tially applying the process of conditioning and marginalisation we can obtain conditional
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marginal models for our subject’s beliefs about the value of the variable XO, conditional on
the observation that XI assumes the value xI:
margO(DG⌋xI) =
{ f ∈ G (XO) : I{xI} f ∈DG}. (2)
Since coherence is trivially preserved under both conditioning and marginalisation, we
find that if the joint model DG is coherent, all the derived models will also be coherent.
Conditional and/or marginal models do not necessarily have to be derived from a joint
model, they can instead also be given as seperate models on their own. In that case we will
generecally denote them as DO⌋xI . The special case of an unconditional marginal model is
sometimes denoted as DO but we will also use the general notation above by letting I = /0
in the general notation above.
3.4. Epistemic irrelevance. We now have the necessary tools to introduce one of the most
important concepts for this paper, that of epistemic irrelevance. We describe the case of con-
ditional irrelevance, as we will show that the unconditional version of epistemic irrelevance
can easily be recovered as a special case.
Consider three disjoint subsets C, I, and O of G. When a subject judges XI to be epi-
stemically irrelevant to XO conditional on XC, he assumes that if he knows the value of XC,
then learning in addition which value XI assumes in XI will not affect his beliefs about
XO. More formally, assume that a subject has for every xC ∈XC a coherent conditional set
of desirable gambles DO⌋xC on XO. If he assesses XI to be epistemically irrelevant to XO
conditional on XC, this implies that he can infer from these models DO⌋xC the following
additional conditional models DO⌋xC∪I on XO:
DO⌋xC∪I = DO⌋xC for all xC∪I ∈XC∪I .
By now, it should be clear that it suffices for the unconditional case, in the discussion above,
to let C = /0. This makes sure the variable XC has only one possible value, so conditioning
on that variable amounts to not conditioning at all.
3.5. Local uncertainty models. We now add local uncertainty models to each of the
nodes s in our network. These local models are assumed to be given beforehand and will be
used further on in Section 4 as basic building blocks to construct a joint model for a given
network.
If s is not a root node of the network, i.e. has a non-empty set of parents P(s), then we
have a conditional local model for every instantiation of its parents. For each xP(s) ∈XP(s),
we have a conditional coherent set Ds⌋xP(s) of desirable gambles on Xs. It represents our
subject’s beliefs about the variable Xs conditional on the information that its parents XP(s)
assume the value xP(s).
If s is one of the root nodes, i.e. has no parents, then our subject’s local beliefs about the
variable Xs are represented by an unconditional local model. It should be a coherent set of
desirable gambles and will be denoted by Ds. As was explained in Section 3.3, we can also
use the common generic notation Ds⌋xP(s) in this unconditional case, since for a root node
s, its set of parents P(s) is equal to the empy set /0.
3.6. The interpretation of the graphical model. In classical Bayesian nets, the graphical
structure is taken to represent the following assessments: for any node s, conditional on its
parent variables, the associated variable is independent of its non-parent non-descendant
variables.
When generalising this interpretation to imprecise graphical networks, the classical no-
tion of independence gets replaced by a more general, imprecise notion of independence
that is usually chosen to be strong independence. In this paper we will not do so, we choose
to use the weaker, assymetric notion of epistemic irrelevance instead, which was introduced
earlier on in Section 3.4. In the special case of precise uncertainty models, both epistemic
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irrelevance and strong independence will reduce to the usual classical notion of independ-
ence and the corresponding interpretations of the graphical network are equivalent with the
one used in a classical Bayesian network.
In the present context, we assume that the graphical structure of the network embodies
the following conditional irrelevance assessments, turning the network into a credal net
under epistemic irrelevance. Consider any node s in the network, its set of parents P(s) and
its set of non-parent non-descendants N(s). Then conditional on its parent variables XP(s),
the non-parent non-descendant variables XN(s) are assumed to be epistemically irrelevant
to the variable Xs associated with the node s.
For a coherent set of desirable gambles DG that describes our subject’s global beliefs
about all the variables in the network, this interpretation has the following consequences.
It can easily be seen from Sections 3.3 and 3.4 that it implies for all s ∈G and all subsets I
of N(s) that
margs(DG⌋xP(s)∪I) = margs(DG⌋xP(s)) for all xP(s)∪I ∈XP(s)∪I . (3)
4. CONSTRUCTING THE MOST CONSERVATIVE JOINT
Let us now show how to construct a global model for the variables in the network, and
argue that it is the most conservative coherent model that extends the local models and
expresses all conditional irrelevancies encoded in the network. But before we do so, let us
provide some motivation. Suppose we have a global set of desirable gambles DG, how do
we express that such a model is compatible with the assessments encoded in the network?
4.1. Defining properties of the joint. We will require our joint model to satisfy the fol-
lowing four properties. First of all, we require that our global model extends the local ones.
This means that the local models derived from the global one should be equal to the given
local models:
G1. For each node s in G, margs(DG⌋xP(s)) = Ds⌋xP(s) for all xP(s) ∈XP(s).
The second requirement is that our model reflects all epistemic irrelevancies encoded in the
graphical structure of the network:
G2. DG satisfies all equalities that are imposed by Eq. (3). In these equalities, the right
hand side can be replaced by Ds⌋xP(s) due to requirement G1.
The third requirement is that our model satisfies the rationality requirement of coherence:
G3. DG is coherent (satisfies requirements D1–D4).
Since requirements G1–G3 do not uniquely determine a global model, there is also a final
requirement, which guarantees that all inferences we make on the basis of our global mod-
els are as conservative as possible, and are therefore based on no other considerations than
what is encoded in the tree:
G4. DG is the smallest set of desirable gambles on XG satisfying requirements G1–G3:
it is a subset of any other set that satisfies them.
We will now show how to construct the unique global model DG that satisfies all off the
four requirements G1–G4 that were given above.
4.2. Constructing the joint. Let us start by looking at a single given marginal model
Ds⌋xP(s)
and investigate some of its implications for the joint model DG. Consider any node s
in the network and fix values xP(s) for its parents. For the local model Ds⌋xP(s) , we now
introduce a corresponding (non-coherent) set A irr
s⌋xP(s)
of desirable gambles on XG:
A
irr
s⌋xP(s)
:=
{
I{xP(s)∪N(s)} f : xN(s) ∈XN(s), f ∈Ds⌋xP(s)
}
. (4)
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It shall become clear by the proposition below that such a set A irr
s⌋xP(s)
indeed contains (some
of the) implications that follow from the local model Ds⌋xP(s) . Next, we bundle all these local
implications:
A
irr
G :=
⋃
s∈G,xP(s)∈XP(s)
A
irr
s⌋xP(s)
. (5)
This results in a set A irrG of desirable gambles on XG that will become essential further
on for our construction of the joint model DG. The importance of this set A irrG is already
manifested by the following proposition, which is proven in Appendix A (as are all other
important results of this paper).
Proposition 1. Consider any s ∈G and xP(s) ∈XP(s). Then the set A irrs⌋xP(s) will be a subset
of any joint model DG satisfying requirements G1 and G2. As a consequence, their union
A irrG will also be a subset of any joint model DG satisfying requirements G1 and G2 and
thus a subset of the unique joint model that satisfies all four requirements G1–G4.
We now propose the following expression for the joint model DG, describing our subject’s
beliefs about the variables in the network and satisfying all four requirements G1–G4:
DG := posi(A irrG ). (6)
Since our eventual joint model DG should be coherent (satisfy requirement G3), and thus in
particular should be a convex cone (satisfy properties D3 and D4), we know that posi(DG)
should be equal to DG. It is therefor very intuitive to consider the set given above, since
posi(posi(D)) = posi(D) for any set of desirable gambles D . On the other hand, it is not
obvious that this set is indeed the unique joint model DG satisfying all four requirements
G1–G4. Therefore, the next part of this paper consists of three propositions that will lead to
the main theorem, which states that the joint model DG does satisfy all four requirements
G1–G4. We start by showing that it contains all positive gambles.
Proposition 2. G (XG)>0 is a subset of posi(A irrG ). As a consequence, we have that
posi(A irrG ) = posi
(
A
irr
G ∪G (XG)>0
)
=: E(A irrG )
This proposition serves as a first step towards the following coherence result, which proves
that our joint model satisfies requirement G3.
Proposition 3. posi(A irrG ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XG.
The proof is given in Appendix A, but it contains an interesting result that deserves to be
pointed out. The crucial step of the proof hinges on the assumption that if the local models
of our network were precise probability mass functions, we would be able to construct a
joint probability mass function that satisfies all irrelevancies (in that case independecies)
that are encoded in our network. Since the precise version of a credal tree under epistemic
irrelevance is a classical Bayesian network, this assumption is indeed true. However, what
is nice about this approach, is that it can easily be extended to credal networks with irrel-
evance assumptions that differ from the ones we use, as long as the assumption above is
satisfied. This enables us to use existing coherence results for precise networks to proof
their counterparts for credal networks.
We now turn to an important proposition that will be essential to prove that our joint
model extends the local models and expresses all conditional irrelevancies encoded in the
network (satisfies requirements G1 and G2).
Proposition 4. Consider any s ∈ G and any subset I of its non-parent non-descendants
N(s). If we fix a value xP(s)∪I ∈XP(s)∪I , then it holds for every f ∈ G (Xs) that
I{xP(s)∪I}
f ∈ posi(A irrG )⇔ f ∈Ds⌋xP(s) .
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We now have all necessary tools to formulate our most important result. It is the main con-
tribution of this paper and provides a justification for the joint model DG that was proposed
by Eq. (6).
Theorem 5. Consider any credal network under epistemic irrelevance with given con-
ditional marginal models Ds⌋xP(s) , then DG = posi(A
irr
G ) is the unique set of desirable
gambles on XG that satisfies all four requirements G1–G4.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a new approach to credal nets. We replaced the commonly
used notion of strong independence with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance and
expressed both our local models and the eventual joint model in the language of sets of
desirable gambles. This has lead to an intuitive, easy expression for a joint model, that
is proven to be the most conservative coherent model that extends the local models and
expresses all conditional irrelevancies encoded in the network.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF IMPORTANT RESULTS
In this Appendix, we give proofs for Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Theorem 5.
Proof of Proposition 1. The second part of this proposition is trivial and we thus only need
to prove the first part. To do so, consider any s ∈ G and xP(s)∪N(s) ∈XP(s)∪N(s). As a con-
sequence of requirements G1 and G2, we see that margs(DG⌋xP(s)∪N(s)) should be equal
to the given local model Ds⌋xP(s) . If we now apply Eq. (2), it follows immediately that
I{xP(s)∪N(s)} f is an element of DG, thereby completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The essential step is to see that for any xG ∈ XG, the indicator
function I{xG} is an element of A
irr
G . To prove this, pick an arbitrary leaf s ∈ G. This is
possible because a DAG with a finite amount of nodes always has at least one leaf. Since s
is a leaf, it has no descendants and we therefore have that G = s∪P(s)∪N(s). Due to the
coherence of the local models, and in particular property D2, the indicator function I{xs} is
an element of Ds⌋xP(s) . We can now apply Eqs. (4) and (5) to see that I{xG} = I{xs∪P(s)∪N(s)}
is an element of A irrG .
Since every f > 0 is a finite strictly positive linear combination of the indicator func-
tions that were constructed above, it follows that posi(A irrG ) does indeed contain all pos-
itive gambles in G (XG)>0. As a consequence, we have that posi(A irrG ) = posi(A irrG )∪
G (XG)>0 and because posi(posi(D)) = posi(D) for any set of desirable gambles D , we
find that posi(A irrG ) = posi
(
posi(A irrG )∪G (XG)>0
)
. The right hand side of this equality
is trivially equal to posi
(
A irrG ∪G (XG)>0
)
=: E(A irrG ), thereby completing the proof. 
Our proof of Proposition 3 uses the following convenient version of the separating hy-
perplane theorem. It is proven in Ref. [4, Lemma 2] and repeated here to make the paper
more self-contained.
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Lemma 6. Consider any finite subset A of G (X). Then 0 /∈ E(A ) := posi(A ∪G (X )>0)
if and only if there is some probability mass function p such that ∑x∈X p(x) f (x)> 0 for all
f ∈A and p(x)> 0 for all x ∈X.
Proof of Proposition 3. Proving that posi(A irrG ) is coherent, means showing that it satisfies
the properties D1–D4. Property D2 is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and the prop-
erties D3 and D4 are trivial since posi(A irrG ) is a convex cone due to the use of the posi
operator. We thus only need to prove the first property, stating that any gamble f ∈ G (XG)
for which f ≤ 0 can not be an element of posi(A irrG ).
So consider any f ∈ posi(A irrG ) and assume ex absurdo that f ≤ 0. We will show that this
leads to a contradiction. Since f is an element of posi(A irrG ), it follows from Eqs. (1), (4)
and (5) that
f = ∑
s∈G
∑
xP(s)∈XP(s)
∑
xN(s)∈XN(s)
I{xP(s)∪N(s)} fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) , (7)
where every fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) is an element of Ds⌋xP(s) ∪ {0} and at least one of them differs
from zero. The only perhaps surprising fact about the equation above, is that it does not
contain any (strictly positive) scaling factors λ s,xP(s),xN(s) . The reason why these factors can
be omitted is that the local models Ds⌋xP(s) are coherent and thus invariant under strictly
positive linear scaling. Therefore, scaling a gamble fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) ∈ Ds⌋xP(s) with a strictly
positive factor λ s,xP(s),xN(s) will still yield a gamble in Ds⌋xP(s) .
Next, for every s ∈ G and xP(s) ∈XP(s) we construct a finite subset of the local model
Ds⌋xP(s)
:
A
f
s⌋xP(s)
:=
{ fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) : xN(s) ∈XN(s) and fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) 6= 0}.
Due to the coherence of Ds⌋xP(s) , we have that 0 /∈ E(A
f
s⌋xP(s)
) ⊆ E(Ds⌋xP(s) ) = Ds⌋xP(s)
and we can therefore apply Lemma 6. This gives us for every s ∈ G and xP(s) ∈ XP(s)
a mass function ps(·|xP(s)) on Xs with expectation operator Es(·|xP(s)) on G (Xs) such that
ps(xs|xP(s))> 0 for all xs ∈Xs and Es(g|xP(s))> 0 for each g ∈A
f
s⌋xP(s)
.
The trick is now to create a Bayesian network that has the conditional mass functions
ps(·|xP(s)) as its local models and has the same graphical structure as our credal net under
epistemic irrelevance. If we let EG be the expectation operator for this Bayesian net, we
find that
EG( f ) = ∑
s∈G
∑
xP(s)∈XP(s)
∑
xN(s)∈XN(s)
EG
(
I{xP(s)∪N(s)} fs,xP(s) ,xN(s)
)
= ∑
s∈G
∑
xP(s)∈XP(s)
∑
xN(s)∈XN(s)
EG
(
I{xP(s)∪N(s)}
)
EG
( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) ∣∣ xP(s))
= ∑
s∈G
∑
xP(s)∈XP(s)
∑
xN(s)∈XN(s)
pG(xP(s)∪N(s))EG
( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) ∣∣ xP(s)),
in which pG is the global mass function of the Bayesian net. Since all the local prob-
abilities ps(·|xP(s)) are strictly positive, this is also true for the global ones and we find
that pG(xP(s)∪N(s)) > 0. For the conditional expectations EG( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) | xP(s)) there are
two possibilities. Either fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) = 0, in which case EG( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) | xP(s)) = 0, either
fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) ∈ A fs⌋xP(s) , in which case EG( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) | xP(s)) > 0. However, since at least
one of the gambles fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) in Eq. (7) has to differ from zero, it is not possible that
EG( fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) | xP(s)) = 0 for all gambles fs,xP(s) ,xN(s) and we can conclude that EG( f )> 0.
If we now apply our assumption ex absurdo that f ≤ 0 and thus EG( f ) ≤ 0, this leads to a
contradiction and completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. The reverse implication is trivial due to the way posi(A irrG ) is
constructed; see Eqs. (1), (4) and (5). It therefore suffices to prove the direct implica-
tion. Consider any s ∈ G, any subset I of its non-parent non-descendants N(s) and fix a
value xP(s)∪I ∈XP(s)∪I . We set out to proof for every f ∈ G (Xs) that f /∈ Ds⌋xP(s) implies
I{xP(s)∪I}
f /∈ posi(A irrG ).
The case f = 0 is trivial because I{xP(s)∪I} f is then equal to zero, which can not be an
element of posi(A irrG ) due to its coherence; see Proposition 3. If f 6= 0, we start by applying
some of the properties of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles that were introduced
in Section 2.4. Due to the first property, we can infer from f /∈Ds⌋xP(s) that there is at least
one maximal set of desirable gambles M ∗
s⌋xP(s)
⊇ Ds⌋xP(s) for which f /∈ M ∗s⌋xP(s) . Due to
the second property and the fact that f 6= 0, this in turn implies that − f ∈M ∗
s⌋xP(s)
.
We now denote by A irr∗G the set that is obtained by Eq. (5) if we replace the local model
Ds⌋xP(s)
by the specific maximal superset M ∗
s⌋xP(s)
that was introduced above. It should be
clear that A irr∗G ⊇ A irrG . Next, since − f ∈ M ∗s⌋xP(s) , it follows from the construction of
A irr∗G that I{xP(s)∪I }(− f ) ∈ A irr∗G ⊆ posi(A irr∗G ). The proof can now be completed if we
realise that I{xP(s)∪I} f /∈ posi(A irr∗G ) because this would contradict with its coherence and
notice that it implies that I{xP(s)∪I } f /∈ posi(A irrG ) because A irr∗G ⊇A irrG . 
Proof of Theorem 5. We start by proving that the joint model DG = posi(A irrG ) satisfies
requirements G1 and G2. To do so, consider any s ∈G, I ⊆ N(s) and xP(s)∪I ∈XP(s)∪I and
an arbitrary gamble h ∈ G (Xs). It can be seen from the following chain of equivalences
that margs(DG⌋xP(s)∪I) = Ds⌋xP(s) .
h ∈ margs(DG⌋xP(s)∪I)⇔ h ∈margs(posi(A irrG )⌋xP(s)∪I)⇔ I{xP(s)∪I}h ∈ posi(A
irr
G )
⇔ h ∈Ds⌋xP(s) .
The second equivalence is a direct application of Eq. 2 and the third one is due to Pro-
position 4. Requirement G1 is now proven by letting I = /0 and requirement G2 is fulfilled
because margs(DG⌋xP(s)∪I) =Ds⌋xP(s) =margs(DG⌋xP(s)). The next step is to show that the
joint model DG = posi(A irrG ) also satisfies requirements G3 and G4.
Requirement G3 demands that DG = posi(A irrG ) is coherent, but since this is proven in
Proposition 3, the only thing that is left to prove is requirement G4. This final requirement
demands that DG = posi(A irrG ) is included in any set of desirable gambles satisfying the
requirements G1–G3. This is easy to proof since we know from Proposition 1 that A irrG is
a subset of any joint model satisfying all four requirements. It then follows from the coher-
ence requirement G3 that DG = posi(A irrG ) is a subset of all joint models satisfying G1–G3
and thus the unique smallest model that also satisfies requirement G4. 
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